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In India, the government launched a US$22.6 billion financial support package for the poor and marginal-
ized as a result of Covid-19. Approximately US$ 4.2 billion (INR 310 billion) came from a vast pile of
unspent social special-purpose funds. How and why did such a large volume of funds accumulate in
the first place, and why did it take a public health emergency to release them? What might be the con-
sequences of their use under such emergency conditions – especially for our understanding of gover-
nance and accountability in social welfare provision?
This paper presents a brief analysis of two preliminary case studies of specific social special-purpose
funds in India. We rely on a handful of unstructured interviews and informal discussions with subna-
tional government officials, civil society actors, trade union representatives, and local community leaders
that began in January 2020, and which were pursued virtually following the lockdown. This is bolstered
by analysis of primary documents, including Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) reports, rel-
evant laws, and contemporary press coverage.
We argue that non-disbursement should be understood as a institutional matter, and not only as tech-
nical or implementation failure. Moreover, as such funds are likely to mushroom following Covid-19, our
findings suggest that policymakers should focus on the institutional design, decision-making and
accountability structures for the flow and distribution of Covid funds, rather than merely emphasising
their collection.
 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In India, poor and vulnerable groups have suffered most from
Covid-19 and the policy measures to fight it.1 Thus, on 26 March
2020, the Indian government announced US$ 22.6 billion (INR 1.7
trillion) in emergency financial support for poor and marginalized
populations – an amount approaching all state spending on social
safety net programs in 2016 (INR 1.87 trillion).2 Approximately US$ 4.2 billion (INR 310 billion) were reallocated from unspent social
special-purpose funds collected for the benefit of construction work-
ers since 1996.
That these funds were available and put to good use is fortu-
nate, but puzzling. How and why did they accumulate in the first
place, and why did it take an emergency to spend them? We focus
here on two funds whose unspent balances were mobilised in
response to Covid-19: the ‘‘building and other construction work-
ers’ welfare cess funds” (BOCW) mentioned above, and ‘‘district
mineral foundations” (DMF), of which US$ 3.4–4.7 billion (INR
250–350 billion) was unspent.
We rely on a handful of unstructured interviews and informal
discussions with officials, civil society actors, trade unionists, and
local community leaders in early-2020; bolstered by analysis of
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) reports, relevant
laws, and press coverage. We do not have a counterfactual case
of non-mobilisation of unspent funds, for the simple reason that
we are endogenous to the mobilisation of BOCW and DMF. These
2 D. Desai, S. Randeria /World Development 136 (2020) 105138funds were our case studies for our broader pilot project, which
directly stimulated their release at the onset of the pandemic.3
2. Terminology and cases
‘‘Social special purpose funds” are collected through force of law
(e.g. hypothecated taxation), so monies accumulate rapidly. They
are held in special purpose legal vehicles (e.g. trusts) for the wel-
fare of specific vulnerable groups, such that the money is ring-
fenced, even if unspent during a fiscal period.
The BOCW is meant to provide a range of long-term benefits,
including medical care, childcare, and pensions, to largely-
unorganized building sector labor. It is raised through a 1% tax
on the cost of construction at large building sites, paid by the
employer to the relevant regional government. The funds are
administered and disbursed by BOCW ‘‘Boards”, which are
appointed by respective regional governments. The Board is a
‘‘body corporate” with equal representation between the state gov-
ernment, employers, and workers. Funds can only be disbursed to
workers who have registered with a particular Board. There are
approximately 35 million registered construction workers across
India (of an estimated 50 million eligible) – although many fewer
have renewed their registration or kept it up to date.4
By July 2018, only 25.8% of collected funds had been spent.5 The
CAG criticized state governments for their failure to disburse – but
with no consequences.6 The Indian Supreme Court ordered the cen-
tral government to spend down the funds following a trade union
complaint;7 but the Court’s order too had little effect. Following
Covid-19, and under civil society pressure, the central government
demanded that Boards disburse unspent balances as direct cash
transfers to construction workers.
The DMF has been collected from mining companies since 2015
for the benefit of communities affected by mining operations, by
way of a 10% royalty on mining proceeds. The total unspent funds
amount to INR 250 billion – 350 billion (USD 3.31 billion – 4.63 bil-
lion). Constituted as public trusts established at the district level,
each DMF is supposed to have a governing body, whose legal form
and composition varies across India. Following Covid-19, the cen-
tral government promulgated regulations allowing local adminis-
trators to redirect 30% of the unspent balances towards
pandemic relief, irrespective of whether the money is spent on
mining-affected communities.3 ‘‘The Puzzle of Unspent Funds: The Institutional Architecture of Unaccountable
Governance”, <http://p3.snf.ch/project-190372>
4 Betwa Sharma, ‘Workers Starve In Lockdown As States Sit On 1000s Of Crores
Collected In Their Name’ (HuffPost India, 16 April 2020) <https://www.huffingtonpost.
in/entry/migrant-workers-lockdown-coronavirus_in_5e972e56c5b66c72a06310c4>
accessed 23 April 2020.
5 Abhivyakti Banerjee and Kashyap Raibagi, ‘Why Construction Workers Missed
Government Welfare Benefits For 23 Years |’ (IndiaSpend, 20 April 2019) <https://
www.indiaspend.com/why-construction-workers-missed-government-welfare-bene-
fits-for-23-years/> accessed 23 April 2020.
6 For example, the CAG report for Delhi (National Capital Territory) for financial
year 2014–15 criticizes the Delhi Board for the ‘‘idling” of BOCW funds, finding its
administration of the funds and registering of eligible workers to be ‘‘not acceptable”:
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, ‘Report of the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India on Social, General and Economic Sectors (Non-Public Sector
Undertakings) for the Year Ended 31 March 2015: Government of National Capital
Territory of Delhi’ (Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2016) 2 of 2016 101–102
<https://cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Delhi_Non_PSU_Report_2_
2016.pdf>. In its 2017–2018 report, the CAG notes that Delhi’s BOCW fund utilization
between 2009 and 2019 ranged from 0.45% to 38.42%, and a 15% worker registration
rate. It again admonishes the Delhi Board, urging it to ‘‘ensure optimum utilization of
these funds”: Comptroller and Auditor General of India, ‘State Finances Audit Report
of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the Year Ended 31 March 2018:
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi’ (Comptroller and Auditor General
of India 2019) 1 of 2019 10.
7 National Campaign Committee for Central Legislation on Construction Labour (NCC-
CL) Versus Union of India & Ors [2018] Supreme Court of India CONMT. PET. (C) No.
52/2013 in W.P. (C) No. 318/2006.3. Why do unspent funds exist, and why could they be
mobilized against Covid-19?
In India, public authorities usually enforce levies and collect
funds as soon as the relevant legislation is passed. Yet it has often
taken the same authorities several years to set up the relevant
special-purpose vehicles, transfer the funds to them, and identify
beneficiaries – never mind spend the collected money. Trusts have
been set up in a little over half of the mining-affected districts in
one study of four Indian states.8 No DMF trusts were established
in the states of Goa and Odisha by 2019 (even though DMF monies
were being collected in each). Many state governments have repeat-
edly been criticised by the CAG for failing to transfer tens of billions
INR of levied funds from government coffers to BOCW accounts.9
And it was five years after setting up its BOCW board that the state
of Uttarakhand registered its first construction worker.
For studies or audits of funds to gain a clear picture of how
much is unspent, they not only have to study the special-purpose
fund itself. They also have to trace the flow of money through the
bureaucracy following collection. We, therefore, studied the flow
of money through these funds via preliminary discussions with
stakeholders, and analyses of CAG reports, laws, and local news
sources. Our initial findings emphasise some legal and bureaucratic
causes of non-spending:
(i) Direct and indirect legal barriers to spending. E.g. bureau-
crats have pointed to difficulties in identifying or registering
people who meet the category of the targeted beneficiaries.
(ii) The structure of bureaucratic organisation. E.g. the forma-
tion of DMF boards has slowed down in part because it is
unclear which state-level and local authorities ought to be
involved – mining officers, officials with a social policy man-
date, the sarpanch (or community leader), etc.
(iii) Petty legal avoidance. E.g. bureaucrats have dragged their feet
in settingupDMF trusts, or officials have placed a high burden
of proof onto prospective BOCW beneficiaries to ensure that
officials cannotbeblamed for themisappropriation of funds.10
(iv) Gross legal avoidance. E.g., political or bureaucratic actors
have used the prescriptive rules of the fund, designed to avoid
misallocation or corruption, to block spending altogether (as
seems to be the case in some of our initial research in Odisha,
where some local politicians blocked the spending of DMF
funds until election time, for maximum political gain).
The Covid-19 crisis led to sudden executive action aimed at
releasing these funds. For example, the federal Minister of Mines
issued a direction to regional governments to release unspent
DMF funds pursuant to his emergency powers to pursue ‘‘any
policy matter in the national interest”.11 The federal Labour and8 Center for Science and Environment, ‘District Mineral Foundation (DMF)’ (2017)
17 <http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/District-Mineral-Founda-
tion-DMF-Report.pdf> accessed 24 April 2019.
9 See, for example, CAG criticisms of Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, andMadhya Pradesh over
financial years 2016–2018: Comptroller and Auditor General of India, ‘Report of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India on State Finances for the Year Ended 31March
2017:Government of Chhattisgarh’ (Comptroller andAuditorGeneral of India 2018) 1 of
2019 46; Comptroller and Auditor General of India, ‘State Finances Audit Report of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the Year Ended 31 March 2018:
Government of Gujarat’ (Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2019) 2 of 2019
26; Comptroller and Auditor General of India, ‘State Finances Audit Report of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the Year Ended 31 March 2018:
Government of Madhya Pradesh’ (Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2019) 1 of
2019 47.
10 Jatinder Mahal, ‘Punjab Govt Says Aadhaar a Must for Labourers to Avail Benefits’
(Hindustan Times, 28 February 2017) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/punjab/
punjab-govt-says-aadhaar-a-must-for-labourers-to-avail-benefits/story-pYJ-
hA5HzfX2F56zCgSk7tM.html> accessed 11 May 2020.
11 Section 20A, Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957.
15 For a summary, see Ajit Jha, ‘COVID-19 Relief Package’ (2020) 55 Economic and
Political Weekly 7.
16 Meera Mohanty, ‘Odisha to Borrow Rs 12K Crore from CAMPA and OMBADC
Funds’ (The Economic Times, 21 April 2020) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
industry/indl-goods/svs/metals-mining/odisha-to-borrow-rs-12k-crore-from-campa-
and-ombadc-funds/articleshow/75280008.cms> accessed 25 April 2020. In our
ongoing research we explore the possibility that unspent funds could be borrowed
in this way under non-emergency conditions, or could even form part of a regular
assessment of a state’s creditworthiness as it accesses capital markets.
17 For example, the new Indian anti-Covid-19 ‘‘PM-CARES” fund received approx-
imately US$ 858 million (INR 65 billion) within its first week of operation. It is run out
of the Prime Minister’s office, but structured as a public charitable trust that is able to
receive direct philanthropic donations. On this basis, the office claims that the trust is
not publicly auditable, nor do the donations have to be disclosed: Priscilla Jebaraj,
‘How Different Is the PM CARES Fund from the PM’s National Relief Fund?’ The Hindu
D. Desai, S. Randeria /World Development 136 (2020) 105138 3Employment Minister enjoined state-level labour ministries to use
their discretionary powers and facilitate the release of the BOCW
funds (even though those ministries participate in, but do not con-
trol, the Boards that manage the funds; and in the normal course
the funds could and should have been used for a range of welfare
activities other than cash payments).12 These executive actions over-
rode the legal and bureaucratic conditions above – for example, by
broadening executive discretion to use the funds: the central gov-
ernment has authorised the District Collector to deploy DMF funds,
bypassing bureaucratic bottlenecks.
We neither have the data nor the context yet to assert the relative
importance of the causes of non-spending that we have identified.
However, when combined with the ways in which they have been
suspended during Covid-19, we suspect that unspent funds may in
part be an institutional phenomenon. We make three arguments:
(1) The social special-purpose vehicles in which these unspent
funds are held are public–private hybrid institutional
forms. These blend very different areas of law and policy –
trusts, public administration, corporations, social policy –
which have different institutional forms and practices. These
may fit together poorly, or produce a great deal of ambiguity
in terms of the types of activities they can fund, as well as
when, how, for whom and whether money has to be spent.
For example, DMFs are inter alia both an administrative
instrument (established by regulation in furtherance of
social policy objectives) and a trust – institutional forms
with fundamentally different forms of decision-making and
accountability.13 For instance, when administrators sit on
DMF boards, can their decisions on spending (or not) DMF
funds be challenged on grounds of maladministration (for
example, acting unreasonably), or of breach of trust (for
example, self-dealing)? The Indian Supreme Court was unable
to effectively compel the executive branch to spend BOCW
funds in a timely fashion for exactly these reasons. As the apex
court noted, the BOCW is governed by a multi-stakeholder
Board, which ‘‘is not an administrative body, but is a body cor-
porate”,14 and thus not subject to judicial review.
(2) Unspent funds institutionalise the political contradictions
inherent in such institutional hybridity. Unspent funds are,
by definition, the absence of a decision. The special-purpose
vehicles of the social special-purpose funds we discuss
impose no positive duty on functionaries to spend. At the
same time, they prevent unspent funds from being reab-
sorbed into state budget lines - for example, by holding the
funds on trust. These vehicles provide significant discretion
to their administrators or trustees on whether or not to
spend, in order to ensure that the fund’s overall policy aims
are met. This is coupled to a series of restrictive provisions
on expenditure designed to make it difficult to disburse the
money in the name of beneficiary targeting or anti-
corruption – for example, requiring construction workers in
the informal sector to maintain a registration with the BOCW
in order to draw on benefits. Our empirical data on whether
fund administrators experience their role in this way is lim-
ited. But we observed administrators foot-dragging even
when it came to establishing the relevant special-purpose
vehicles that would bring the money under their control.
Administrators did not seem to find it urgent to get the12 News Services Division, ‘Govt Issues Advisory to Transfer Funds in Accounts of
Construction Workers through DBT Mode’ (All India Radio, 25 March 2020) <http://
newsonair.com/Main-News-Details.aspx?id=383792> accessed 25 April 2020.
13 Timothy Endicott, ‘Equity and Administrative Behaviour’ in PG Turner (ed), Equity
and Administration (Cambridge University Press 2016).
14 National Campaign Committee for Central Legislation on Construction Labour (NCC-
CL) Versus Union of India & Ors. (n 7) at para 30.money flowing. Furthermore, beneficiary groups tend to be
socially vulnerable, under-resourced, and/or otherwise polit-
ically marginal. For the BOCW, until the Covid-19 crisis there
have been limited efforts on the part of the Boards to actively
register eligible construction workers (in spite of repeated
chivvying by the CAG). It is thus unclear from where the
political pressure to expend, as well as scrutiny of the mode
of decision-making and delivery of funds, may come.15
(3) The emergency use of these funds paradoxically further
entrenches these contradictions. Take the emergency redi-
rection of DMF funds for the general purpose of combating
Covid-19. Here, the central government subsumed the inter-
ests of mining-affected communities into a narrative of the
pursuit of the general good - the definition of which is left to
the discretion of the District Collector, the most powerful
bureaucrat at the local level. But indoingso,whatof theclaims
of the affected communities that were the designated benefi-
ciaries of these funds, or of their specific hardships that the
DMFwasmeant to remedy?Does the redirection of funds also
preclude mining-affected community members from holding
officials to account for failing to uphold their interests?4. Analysis
The emergency use of these funds is clearly not corruption in
the sense of direct (mis)appropriation for immediate private gain.
Rather, we have pointed to state re-appropriation of funds for
politically-pressing ends under emergency conditions. We have
also observed one case of indirect appropriation: in the name of
fighting Covid-19, the Odisha state government borrowed up to
US$ 1.5 billion (INR 170 billion), at a below-market interest rate,
from unspent funds intended to mitigate the environmental effects
of mining on local communities.16
So framed, there may be political reasons for non-spending.
Social special-purpose vehicles provide political recognition to
marginalised groups. Their rights and entitlements are not fully
realised, but rather transformed into unspent funds that are open
to future appropriation. There is also little accountability for any
actor who keeps that pot unspent. As such funds are likely to
mushroom following Covid-19, our findings suggest that policy-
makers should focus on the institutional design and accountability
structures for the flow and distribution of Covid funds, as well as
their collection.17(10 May 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/coronavirus-how-differ-
ent-is-the-pm-cares-fund-from-the-pms-national-relief-fund/article31546287.ece>
accessed 11 May 2020; Vatsal Bhandari, ‘Indian Companies Are Contributing Lavishly
to PM-CARES – Even amid Layoffs and Pay Cuts’ (Scroll.in, 9 May 2020) <https://scroll.
in/article/961383/indian-companies-are-contributing-lavishly-to-pm-cares-even-
amid-layoffs-and-pay-cuts> accessed 11 May 2020; Sunil Prabhu, ‘PM CARES Fund
Won’t Be Checked By Government’s Auditor, Say Sources’ (NDTV.com, 24 April 2020)
<https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/coronavirus-pm-cares-fund-wont-be-checked-
by-cag-say-sources-2217714> accessed 25 April 2020.
4 D. Desai, S. Randeria /World Development 136 (2020) 105138Such a preliminary hypothesis is open to further empirical and
comparative study: it fits well within the tradition of fiscal sociol-
ogy, in which state-society relationships are reconfigured through
the public fisc (‘‘[t]he budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of
all misleading ideologies”);18 as well as analyses of the state in
times of emergency, in which those same relationships are revealed
and reconfigured through the legal and institutional tools used to
declare emergencies and facilitate executive action.19
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